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Advances in bothmedicine and science continue to raise difficult questions. Scien-
tific advancement, emerging technologies, and the evolving nature of medicine
have conferred many advantages on society. However, these advantages are not
trouble-free. The price to pay for advancement is, of course, the creation of new
risks. Many would argue that this is a small price to pay, particularly when
viewed against the backdrop of the advances achieved in modern medicine and
science over the years. Nonetheless, there is a tension which has caused a great
deal of controversy, and attracted the attention of philosophers, ethicists, and
lawyers alike. Whereas the bioethicist is primarily concerned with the controver-
sial ethical questions born out of the relationship between science, technology,
medicine, philosophy, politics, and the law, the specific challenge for the law
per se is grounded in how it responds to the constant developments taking place
within these various disciplines. As scientific and medical knowledge expands,
and as new dangers are exposed as a result of this, what role should the law
play? Indeed, to what extent can different types of law be used to meet the new
challenges presented?
The civil law is one area of law that does have a part to play in responding to the
new risks inherent in pioneering medicine and expanding technologies; it can be
used to set prescriptive standards and also to provide compensatory redress to
those who have been harmed by the careless conduct of others. Yet, as its focus
is predominantly on the relationship between two parties, its potential impact in
terms of the bigger picture is rather limited. It overlooks some of the greater soci-
etal considerations suchas regulation, deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation.
These are all factors commonly associated with the criminal law and so when
medicine and bioethics are viewed from a wider perspective, the significance of
the criminal law begins to shine through. However, while the importance of the
criminal law is not, of itself, in dispute, certain questions remain which are far
less certain and which areworthy of in-depth discussion and analysis. If the crim-
inal law is going to regulate certain ethically delicate and sensitive areas of medi-
cine, science, and technology,what precise formshould that regulation take? If the
law adopts a heavy-handed approach to regulation, it may stifle creativity and in-
genuity indisciplineswhere it is needed themost, therebyworking to thedetriment
of societyon thewhole. There is even an argument that in certain areas there ought
to be no external scrutiny at all from the criminal law, and that any supervision is
best left to the profession itself and to the individual conscience of doctors and
scientists. The debate also continues about the extent to which the criminal law
provides any real deterrent effect. How, if at all, can the criminal law be utilised
to deter doctors and scientists from participating in dangerous activities and bad
practice that have the knock on effect of exacerbating existing dangers to the
Medical Law Review, 0, 2013, pp. 1–9
Medical Law Review# The Author [2013]. Published by Oxford University Press; all rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
 Medical Law Review Advance Access published August 8, 2013
 by guest on July 17, 2014
http://m
edlaw
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
public?Finally, if oneof themainaimsof the criminal law is topunishwrongdoers,
what type and magnitude of sanction befits individuals who may have acted
recklessly but with the best of motives?
With all these questions in mind, it is remarkable that there has been a dearth of
literature thatattemptstotieall these issuestogetherandaddress someofthe import-
ant points raised above. The Criminal Law and Bioethical Conflict: Walking the
Tightrope seeks to redress this problem and a text such as this has been long
overdue in academia. The book is one of many outputs of the AHRC-funded
project, ‘The Impact of the Criminal Process on Health Care Ethics and Practice’,
which is a collaborative venture between the Universities of Manchester, Birming-
ham,andLancaster.Thiscollectionofessaysbringstogether someofthepreeminent
names inmedical law, ethics, and philosophy and explores, in detail, the role of the
criminal lawand someof the tensionswhich exist between that and the discipline of
bioethics. Each individual author has selected a contemporary and original topic,
and constructed a short chapter discussing the legal and bioethical issues which
are apparent within. In a project such as this, the difficult task for any editor is
keeping the authors on task andnot allowing them togooff at a tangent.Moreover,
the essays thatmake up the substantive content of the bookmust relate to an under-
lying set of themeswhich permeate the entire text so as not to give the reader the im-
pression that this is just a group of disparate essays mixed together. When you are
dealing with a number of different scholars, from a variety of disciplines and back-
grounds, this is not an easy process tomanage and the editors of this volume should
be applauded for the excellent job they have done.
One of the strengths of the book is that it explains, from the outset, how the
volume is organised and alerts the reader to the key underlying themes of
the text.1 Many books such as this purport to do exactly the same thing, but as
the reader progresses into the substantive material there is a dawning realisation
that the essays do not necessarily relate to the key themes and there is a propensity
to feel lost, rendering it difficult to make connections between key ideas and argu-
ments. This does not happen here and as you read on it is easy to make those
all-important connections. It is worth identifying at this point what some of those
key themes actually are in order to set the scene for this review. First, many of the
authors explore what the appropriate limits of the criminal law should be.
Second, some of the essays explore the role and character of the actor and
whether this makes a difference to when it is considered appropriate to blame
them, and, in some instances, hold them criminally liable. Moral controversy is
also a recurrent idea that features inmanyof the essays, as is the paternalism/auton-
omy divide and the extent towhich the state should act paternalistically to regulate
certain types of behaviourandwhen it is, and isnot, appropriate tooverride individ-
ual autonomy. Finally, the degree towhich, and onwhat grounds, certain scientific
research and endeavours should be permissible is analysed in considerable depth.
In order to bring these interconnecting themes to fruition and to ensure the book
has a coherent narrative running through it, the essays are organised into four
1 AAlghrani, RBennett, SOst, ‘Introduction—WhenCriminal LawEncounters Bioethics:
A Case of Tensions and Incompatibilities or An Apt Forum for Resolving Ethical Con-
flict?’ Ch 1.
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distinct sections.Part Iof thebook isdedicated todeath,dying, and thecriminal law;
Part II concerns freedom and autonomy; Part III covers criminalising biomedical
science; and Part IV focuses on bioethics and criminal law in the dock. The essays
themselves have all been placed under the appropriate heading and it is plain to
see where they fit into the overall scheme of the project. There are far too many
essays to do justice to each in this review. Thus, I will focus on what I consider to
be the most interesting aspects of the book. This is not to do a disservice to those
which do not specifically get a mention, my choices simply reflect those specific
essays that captured my imagination and caused me to challenge my own assump-
tions about the topic under discussion.
The first section of the book concentrates on death, dying, and the law. It con-
tains three chapters which focus on the challenging yet well traversed issue of eu-
thanasia. In a text as original and innovative as this, it is perhaps a little
disappointing that the first two substantive chapters do little more than reinvent
manyof the time-honouredarguments in favourof, andagainst, thedecriminalisa-
tion of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. Two prominent scholars in the
field, JohnGriffiths andJohnKeown,unsurprisinglyapproach thedebate fromop-
posite ends of the spectrum.2 Griffiths argues in favour of decriminalisation of eu-
thanasiaas it isnecessary for the safetyofpatientsandbecause therearenorelevant
differences between euthanasia and the long-established legal and justifiedways in
whichdoctors intentionally cause thedeathof patients.Keown,on theotherhand,
analyses what he considers to be five flawed arguments in respect of decriminalis-
ing euthanasia, thereby reinforcing his well-known position that the law should
continue to prohibit behaviour of this kind. Of course, the main problem with
this is that the debate will never be resolved and for every argument that is pre-
sented on one side, there is an equally credible counter argument on the other.
For me, as a reviewer, Griffiths constructs the more compelling case. That does
not mean that Keown’s thesis is completely unconvincing. In the build-up to this
publication, I was fortunate enough to be present at the conference inManchester
where thesenotableopponentsdebated the issue inpersonandone thing struckme
more than anything. However convinced I was by the strength of Griffiths’ argu-
ment, Keown raised the bar on that day in terms of the style, manner, and confi-
dence with which he presented his case. He is every bit as meticulous a scholar
as he is accomplished a presenter, and no matter how much one disagrees with
him, there is an enigmatic power of persuasion in his writing and public speaking
that ought to serve as a warning shot to each of us on the other side of the debate
that we, in turn, must raise our game if we are to take this forward and press for
legal change.
A text such as this could never eschewa discussion of death and euthanasia, but
the opening exchanges mean that the book is slow to get going and we do not see
anything fresh until we come across Richard Huxtable’s interesting and discrete
perspective on euthanasia.3 Huxtable approaches the question from a slightly dif-
ferent angle and his view is somewhat revitalising. Rather than focusing on the
2 J Griffiths, ‘Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Should, When Properly Performed By A
Doctor In An Appropriate Case, Be Decriminalised’ Ch 2; J Keown, ‘Five Flawed Argu-
ments for Decriminalising Euthanasia’ Ch 3.
3 R Huxtable, ‘Euthanasia Excused: Between Prohibition and Permission’ Ch 4.
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arguments for and against decriminalisation of euthanasia per se, he suggests that
the law should adopt acompromise approach.His chapter discusseswhen to com-
promise, how to compromise in general, and then analyses how the law should
compromise specifically in relation euthanasia. The emphasis for Huxtable is on
the language of excuse rather than justification and he argues that we should
mark out assisted dying as a particular and compassionate type of killing, charge-
able asadistinctoffence, andalsoavailableasapartialdefence to certainhomicide
charges (p. 66).One problemwith a specific offence such as this is that a lotwould
hinge on being able to identify a compassionatemotive from the defendant.Many
would argue that this is out of square with traditional criminal principles which
repeatedly state that motive plays no part in the law of murder.4 Huxtable deals
with this criticism by acknowledging that whatever the correct theoretical legal
position may be, the reality is that the law does consider motive, and does so in
a number of different guises. Its appearance in the DDP’s Prosecuting Policy for
Cases of Assisted Suicide is a classic example of this, and one that is rightly
acknowledged by the author (p. 66).5 The finer details of the offence, by Huxta-
ble’s own admission, would need fleshing out in more depth (p. 67), and one
notable concern that requires further thought is the impact that this would have
on the wider physician-assisted suicide debate.
Huxtable’s claim that qualifying cases should be prosecuted consistently, irre-
spective of the professional status of the defendant, will not be well received by the
medical profession (p. 66). Increasing the possibility of prosecution for healthcare
professionals who help patients to die may serve to alienate further medical
support for any reform in the law. If the law is to change in any way, whether in
the form of the compromise position or the legalisation of controlled
physician-assisted suicide, support from the medical profession will be crucial in
effecting any change. The threat of prosecution, no matter how much discretion is
available to the courts in sentencing, may be enough to deter compassionate
doctors from helping patients to diewho need it themost. To some this will be a de-
sirable result of a new law; to others it is not. Either way, the threat of prosecution
would not exist to the same extent if the law were to change in a more radical way
to legalise and regulate controlled physician-assisted suicide and so, for some, this
may still represent the more sensible move. Nevertheless, the idea of compromise,
in principle, is an attractive proposition in medico-legal discourse. More often
than not, when the law is facedwith polarised views shrouded in moral, philosoph-
ical, and ethical uncertainty, it does adopt whatmanywould describe as themiddle
ground, and in sensitive fields such as abortion, embryo research, and advance deci-
sion making, the compromise position works for the majority of people. Thus, the
idea itself is there and the discussion is lively and stimulating. For this reason, it is
interesting to read howHuxtable develops this idea in his own recent book.6
4 See recentlyR v Inglis [2010] EWCA2637;AiredaleNHSTrust v Bland [1993] AC 789,
HL; R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38.
5 CPS, ‘Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide’
issued by The Director of Public Prosecutions, February 2010.
6 R Huxtable, Law, Ethics and Compromise at the Limits of Life: To Treat or Not To
Treat? (Routledge-Cavendish 2012).
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Part II of the book is where this collectivework really starts to flourish and con-
tains three thought-provoking chapters on freedom and autonomy which are all
enjoyable to read.Robert Smithopensupwith achapteronBody Integrity Identity
Disorder,7 closely followed by an engaging discussion from David Gurnham on
the contours of consent in HIV transmission and rough horseplay cases.8 The
most notable contribution in the section, however, is from Suzanne Ost and
Hazel Biggs who explore the criminality of consensual sexual activity between
doctors and patients.9 Their short essay broaches a number of important issues,
both from a theoretical legal standpoint and also from a real-world perspective.
They raise the question as to whether sexual activity between doctor and patient
can ever truly be consensual. My initial reaction to this question was: ‘yes, it
can’, but the answer is not that simple.Where a doctor participates in sexual activ-
ity without a patient’s consent, it is fairly clear that the criminal law ought to, and
will be, engaged. The more difficult situation, though, is when there is some form
of consent from the patient but where it is arguable that the consent has only been
obtained because the doctor is in a more powerful position and has induced,
enticed, or caused the patient to feel that they are unable to say no (p. 113).
Certainly where consent is obtained through deception, coercion, or inducement,
there is evidenceof exploitation,which is enough in itself toquestion thevalidityof
a patient’s consent. Here, asOst and Biggs correctly identify, there is a strong case
that the criminal lawshouldhavea role toplay (p.116).Yet, as it stands, it doesnot
adequately capture all instances of exploitation and perhaps the introduction of a
new abuse of trust offence could act as a panacea in the future (p. 116).
The more curious part of this, however, revolves around the acknowledgement
from the authors that not every relationship between a doctor and a patient will
involve exploitation; there are some cases in which there will be a genuinely con-
sensual relationship (p. 116). This is of particular interest, especially amid the
hard-line approach that the GMC takes towards doctor patient relationships.10
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. An adult male patient visits his
femaleGPof a similaragewith a recurring football injury forwhichheneeds treat-
ment in order to play in the amateur divisional cup final in two weeks’ time. The
doctor prescribes painkillers, anti-inflammatories, and demonstrates some exer-
cises that she advises the patient to perform on a daily basis. The male patient
then leaves, follows her advice, and is fit to play in the final. During the course
of the game, the male patient notices that his doctor is watching because, unbe-
known to him, she is an avid followerof amateur football and haswatched the op-
position in every game of the season. After the game in the clubhouse, the patient
anddoctorbump into eachotherat thebar; she askshowhisknee is andheasksher
opinionabout the game.The conversationdevelops andeventually thedoctorasks
7 R Smith, ‘Body Integrity Identity Disorder—A Problem of Perception?’ Ch 5.
8 DGurnham, ‘Risky Sex and“ManlyDiversions”:TheContours ofConsent inCriminal
Law—Transmission and Rough Horseplay Cases’ Ch 6.
9 S Ost and H Biggs, ‘“Consensual” Sexual Activity Between Doctors and Patients:
A Matter for the Criminal Law?’ Ch 7.
10 GMC, Maintaining A Professional Boundary Between You and Your Patient (GMC,
2013), paras 4, 6. For example, Oladapo Idowu had a sexual relationship with two of
his patients. A Fitness to Practise Panel upheld the allegations made against him and
his name was subsequently removed from the Medical Register in 2007.
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if the patient would like to go out for a drink sometime. He agrees and as a result
they eventually begin a relationship. Supposing this relationship is not platonic,
would this be genuinely consensual sexual activity? I would argue it is. Has the
patient been exploited by the doctor? Assuming that her motives in attending
the game and initiating the conversation by asking about the knee injury were
genuine, Iwould argue not. Irrespective of this, even if the female doctor hadques-
tionable motives, the exploitation has not caused any real harm to the patient, in
fact the patient will most probably feel quite the opposite, so at what point dowe
say it is appropriate for the criminal lawto step in?With this inmind,Ost andBiggs
have to be correct in concluding that certain relationships between doctors and
patients are genuinely consensual and not all based on exploitation, although
the caveat that they place on it, that genuine caseswill be rare, is accurate (p. 116).
Nevertheless, the jury is still out onwhether theGMC’s guidance recognises this
to the extent that it should. At various points in the chapter, it is stressed that
doctorswill be called to account professionally for engaging in inappropriate rela-
tionships. In its most recent guidance, published after this volume inMarch 2013,
theGMCstates that ‘youmustnotpursuea sexual or improperemotional relation-
shipwithacurrentpatient’.11Admittedly, theguidance is a littlemore circumspect
in respect of former patients as it does not expressly forbid all relationships
between a doctor and former patient where the professional doctor/patient rela-
tionship has ended,12 but notwithstanding this the GMC perhaps needs to tread
carefully in respect of its guidance. For example, in the hypothetical scenario dis-
cussed above, the male patient may still be registered with the general practice at
which the femaledoctorworksafter their relationshiphasbegunandwould, there-
fore, technically remain a patient of hers. If the GMC followed its guidance to the
letter, adopted the intransigent stance that it sets out towards that particular rela-
tionship and sought to sanction the doctor, surely there ought to be a discussion
about the lawfulness of such guidance. It is not difficult to envisage a legal chal-
lenge being brought by means of a judicial review by the doctor. The possibility
of success would, in all likelihood, be remote, but an argument under Article 8
could undoubtedly also be made that a court would have to consider. This claim
would probably centre on the invasion of the right to respect for private and
family life, and the unyielding nature of any professional regulatory regime that
sought to impingeon this disproportionately.What is clear is that interesting ques-
tions still remain; these focusnotonlyon thedegreeof exploitation thatought tobe
required in order to invoke the criminal law, but also about the interface between
the criminal law and professional regulation. Hopefully the planned future work
alluded to by Ost and Biggs will develop some of these issues.
The third part of the book investigates criminalising biomedical science. This is
perhaps the most exciting section, which is mainly due to the originality of the
chapters and the exigent questions that many of the topics under investigation
pose. Sara Fovargue’s chapter on xenotransplantation raises awareness of some
11 GMC, Maintaining A Professional Boundary Between You and Your Patient (GMC,
2013), paras 4, 6.
12 Ibid, para 8.
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of the difficulties created by this emerging biotechnology.13 Amid statistics that
show there is a real shortage of human organs available for transplantation,14
the immediate reaction to a breakthrough such as xenotransplantation is that it
canonlybe a good thing and, if the science andmedicinewhichunderpin it areper-
fected, would confer many benefits on society. On one level, this view is accurate,
but it neglects to consider some important risks that run hand in hand with bio-
medical developments of this kind. Fovargue discusses these potentially serious
risks and proceeds to consider how the law should respond to them. In doing so,
she constructs a cogent argument for a new xenotransplantation statute which
would provide an effective regime to regulate activity within this field. The idea
of a xeno-surveillance scheme, supported by the criminal law to enforce compli-
ance and, where appropriate, early anticipatory action, ought to be welcomed.
Provided, of course, this new statute adopts a similar approach to that embraced
by theHumanFertilisationandEmbryologyActs,whichare essentiallypermissive
in nature, the creation of this lawwould be advantageous. This is because itwould
allowmedicine and science to flourishwith the necessary legal protections inplace
to appease those who are rightly concerned about the potentially far-reaching
nature of the risks created by xenotransplants. In a comparableway toHuxtable’s
earlier chapter, Fovargue admits that the further particulars of any proposed
statute would need to be considered very carefully and it is unfortunate that
there is not enough room for this to be explored in further detail within the text
(p. 154). However, Fovargue’s existing work in this field is illuminating, and she
has almost certainly paved the way for this discussion in the future.15
Following on from this, the reader is confronted by a particularly entertaining
and uplifting chapter from Nishat Hyder and John Harris.16 As a reviewer, this
chapter wrong-footed me initially and did so for a number of reasons. First, the
topic was incredibly specialised and stood out as being markedly different from
the previous essays; this grabbed my attention immediately. Second, after
reading the title of the essay, I had assumed that the authors would argue the op-
positeway than in fact they did andwas pleasantly surprised to read their view on
this current issue. The crux of their argument is that a more balanced and rational
approach should be adopted in respect of access to chemical and cognitive enhan-
cers (CCE’s) and that it is inappropriate for the criminal law to interfere in an indi-
vidual’s quest for self-improvement (p. 174). Some may view this as a
controversialposition toadopt,but controversyprovokesthe reader to think.Like-
wise, the analysis is crisp and the argument well crafted. There will inevitably be
13 SFovargue, ‘BioethicalConflictandDevelopingBiotechnologies: Is Protecting Individual
and Public Health from the Risks of Xenotransplantation A Matter for the (Criminal)
Law?’ Ch 9.
14 According to theNHSBTwebsite in 2011/12, the number of people on theOrganDonor
Register rose to 18.7 million. The total number of organ transplants carried out in the
period April 2011 to March 2012 was 3,953, an improvement on the 3,725 transplants
recorded in 2010/11. Despite these achievements, over 10,000 people are in need of an
organ in the UK. See NHSBT Annual Review 2011/2012: http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/
annualreview/organ_donation_transplantation/.
15 See, for example, S Fovargue, Xenotransplantation and Risk: Regulating A Developing
Biotechnology (Cambridge University Press 2012).
16 N Hyder and J Harris, ‘The Criminal Law and Enhancement—None of the Law’s Busi-
ness?’ Ch 10.
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thosewho disagree and it will no doubt be fascinating to hear their riposte, but for
the timebeing this chapter leaves some interestingquestionshanging in thebalance
about the precise role and contours of the criminal law in a society where auton-
omy is becoming an increasingly important principle.
The final part of the book investigates bioethics and criminal law in the dock.
Margaret Brazier starts the ball rolling in a typically well written and analytical
chapter focusing on whether English law can accommodate moral controversy
in medicine.17 Abortion is used as the hook to frame the discussion, and Brazier
develops her thesis by reference to the enduring debates on this subject which
have existed for centuries. Her assertion that there is no ‘right’ answer to the sanc-
tity of life conundrum is certainly a sensible way to view the problem (p. 202).
Therewill inevitably be thosewhowill oppose this by suggesting that it is entirely
possible to separate the ‘right’ fromthe ‘wrong’and that the criminal law isamech-
anism bywhich this can be achieved, yet the lawmust be sensitive to diversity and
cannot simply reflect this narrow perspective. Competing values, opinions, and
beliefs may come to the fore, all of which may be equally as important as each
other, but which will invariably affect the way in which a person thinks about a
particular matter. The law must recognise this and, insofar as possible, have due
regard to these divergent views. Brazier identifies one of the key themes of the
text as the symbolic role of the criminal law (p. 202). This is quite true, but
another key theme that we can draw out from this chapter is the notion of com-
promise, alluded to earlier in Huxtable’s chapter. Instead of the criminal law sup-
porting one particular side of the debate over the other, it is sometimes sensible for
the law to find the middle ground, as it does in relation to abortion, in order to
resolve moral controversy in a way that accommodates the majority of society.
If the criminal law inEnglandwastoadopt this attitude in respectofotherdelicate-
ly poised areas, such as physician-assisted suicide, it would represent a significant
step forward.
Further on in this section, there is an elegantlywritten chapter from Jose´Miola,
which addresses the question of deference towards the medical profession.18
Miola effectively analyses deference in a civil context beforemaking the transition
todeference in the criminal sphere.His conclusion that the civil courts have sought
to ‘wrestle back control’ in the post-Bolitho era is accurate, at least on a theoretical
level (p. 234). Nonetheless, uncertainty remains about the true impact of
Bolitho19 and the extent towhich thecourts arewilling tocarryout the ‘hard-look’
approach to the medical evidence that was advocated in the case.20 Carrying this
over into the criminal law, once again a case can be made out for a general loss of
deference towards themedical profession, evidencedby the increase in the number
of gross negligence manslaughter cases. Yet, as is identified, conviction rates
remain low and are certainly lower than in other forms of manslaughter
(p. 229). All things being considered, then, a sensible caveat from Miola in
17 MBrazier, ‘CanEnglishLawAccommodateMoralControversy inMedicine?TheCaseof
Abortion’ Ch 12.
18 J Miola, ‘The Impact of the Loss of Deference Towards the Medical Profession’ Ch 14.
19 Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, HL.
20 See R Mulheron, ‘Trumping Bolam: A Critical Legal Analysis of Bolitho’s “Gloss”’
(2010) 69 CLJ 609.
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regard to the general loss of deference is that the problem should not be overstated
and that doctors do not need to fear the general direction of the law (p. 234). They
may, indeed, be subject to closer legal scrutiny, both civilly and criminally, but
whether this has any practical bearing on the outcome in the majority of cases is
much less clear. Medicine is still regarded as an esteemed profession and doctors
are still well respected by judges. With this in mind, even though many would
argue differently, can a case be made out that doctors are indeed a special case
when it comes to the law? In the next chapter, which follows on neatly, David
Archard makes a controversial yet convincing case for this.21
Turning now to themain criticisms of the book, two points areworthmention-
ing.Themain complaint is that the chapters,whilewellwritten andexciting, often
leave you wanting more. An idea is introduced which whets the appetite only for
the authors to then repeatedly state that more thought will need to be given to the
minutiaeof the idea inorder for it tobear fruit. Inone sense, this is notnecessarilya
bad thing, especially given that this book is labelled volume 1 and so one has to
assume that there will be a volume 2 further down the line. If this is the case, it
will be interesting to seewhether someof the ideas airedhere are, in fact, developed
more substantially later on, orwhether a fresh set of authors covering newand en-
tirely different topics will be incorporated into the next volume. One of the prin-
cipal reasons for some of the chapters not being able to explore the issues in as
much depth as both the authors and the readers may have liked is due to the
tight word limit that was bound to have been imposed on each contributor in
order to accommodate all of the chapters contained within. This feeds directly
into the second main criticism. There are perhaps too many chapters in this
book. It may have been worth considering cutting back on the number of contri-
butors thereby freeing up more space for some of the more original arguments
to be developed. This may have made the job of the editors even more difficult
because selecting which chapters made the final cut would not have been easy.
Even so it is perhaps something to reflect on in thedevelopmentof thenext volume.
Small criticisms aside, this book is a major success. It is original, thought pro-
voking, and covers awide range of contemporary issueswhich everyone interested
in bioethics,medicine, and the lawwill take pleasure in reading.While this book is
aimed largely at an academic audience, it will definitely garner interest from prac-
titioners, both medical and legal, scientists and students on undergraduate and
postgraduate courses across the country. The work is a striking example of the
fabulous use that funding from UK Research Councils, such as the AHRC, can
be put to when managed efficiently and effectively. The next published output
from this project is certain to be eagerly anticipated by everyone with an interest
in this vibrant and ever-changing field.
Rob Heywood
University of East Anglia
doi:10.1093/medlaw/fwt026
21 D Archard, ‘Criminalising Medical Negligence’ Ch 15.
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